

Message Text

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SUBJECT: HIGHLIGHTS: POST-MEETING DISCUSSIONS

JULY9, 1975 (SALT TWO -667)

1. CRUISE MISSILES. SHCHUKIN (TO BROWN, A-892) NOTED AMBASSADOR JOHNSON'S STATEMENT OF MONDAY TO THE EFFECT THAT IF CRUISE MISSILES WERE TO BE COVERED, IT WOULD HAVE TO BE IN A DIFFERENT WAY THAN BALLISTIC MISSILES. HE ASKED HOW AIR-TO-SURFACE CRUISE MISSILES AND AIR-TO -SURFACE BALLISTIC MISSILES MIGHT BE TREATED DIFFERENTLY.

2. BROWN REPLIED THAT ONE POSSIBILITY WOULD BE TO USE DIFFERENT RANGES. SHCHUKIN SAID THAT HE WAS AWARE OF THI IDEA. BROWN THEN ASKED WHETHER SHCHUKIN HAD OTHER SUGGESTIONS. SHCHUKIN SAID THAT HE FOUND IT HARD TO FIND A BASIS FOR DIFFERING TREATMENT OF CRUISE AND BALLISTIC AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILES. THEIR EFFECTS ON THE TARGET WERE THE SAME. BROWN RESPONDED THAT THAT MIGHT BE SO IF THEY REACH THE TARGET, BUT THAT THE PROBABILITY OF REACHING THE TARGET WAS NOT THE SAME IN LIGHT OF DIFFERENCES IN THE DEFENSES AGAINST THESE TWO CATEGORIES OF MISSILES. SHCHUKIN

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REPLIED THAT,AS MAY HAD POINTED OUT IN MONDAY'S CONVERSATION,

BOMBERS ARE NOT IN FACT FIRST-STRIKE WEAPONS. THEREFORE, PRESUMABLY THERE WOULD HAVE BEEN AN EXCHANGE OF BALLISTIC MISSILES BEFORE A BOMBER ATTACKED. SUCH AN EXCHANGE WOULD HAVE DISRUPTED THE AIR DEFENSES, IN HIS OPINION, SUFFICIENTLY SO THAT THE BOMBERS COULD PENETRATE. THUS HE DID NOT ACCEPT THE BOMBER PENETRATION ARGUMENT AS A REASON FOR DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN ALCMS AND ALBMS. WITH RESPECT TO THE ACCURACY OF CRUISE AND BALLISTIC MISSILES, HIS VIEW WAS THAT IN PRINCIPLE THEY CAN BE MADE THE SAME.

3. BROWN NOTED AN ADDITIONAL DISTINCTION, ALCMS OF RANGE GREATER THAN 600KM EXIST NOW (US HOUND DOG) WHEREAS ALBMS DO NOT, SHCHUKIN MENTIONED SRAM AS NOW COMING INTO THE US INVENTORY, BUT BROWN NOTED THAT ITS RANGE IS MUCH LESS THAN 600KM. BROWN WENT ON TO SAY THAT NEW ALCMS COULD THEREFORE BE CONSIDERED AS MODERNIZATION AND REPLACEMENT, A RIGHT DEAR TO THE SOVIETS, AND A DISTINCTION BETWEEN ALCMS AND ALBMS.

4. SHCHUKIN MENTIONED THAT CRUISE MISSILES HAD DIFFERENT SPEED AND ALTITUDE FROM BALLISTIC MISSILES, BUT CONSIDERED THAT THIS DID NOT PROVIDE A BASIS FOR DIFFERENT TREATMENT. BROWN THEN SUMMARIZED THREE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN ALCMS AND ALBMS: TECHNICAL CHARACTERISTICS (SPEED, ALTITUDE, ETC); DIFFERING LEVELS OF DEFENSE AGAINST THEM; AND THE PRESENT EXISTENCE OF ALCMS BUT NOT OF ALBMS WITH RANGES GREATER THAN 600KM. BROWN SUGGESTED THAT THESE COULD BE TAKEN ACCOUNT OF IN FORMULATING LIMITATIONS.

5. SHCHUKIN THEN TURNED TO THE NEED TO LIMIT OTHER KINDS OF CRUISE MISSILES, INCLUDING THOSE LAUNCHED FROM SURFACE SHIPS AND NON-BOMBER AIRCRAFT, BROWN IN TURN BROUGHT UP THE QUESTION OF THE SOVIET PROGRAM FOR HEAVY MISSILES, AND FOR REPLACING THE OLDER LIGHT MISSILES WITH NEW ONES OF MUCH GREATER PAYLOAD. BROWN SAID THIS SEQUENCE OF EVENTS HAD PERTURBED MANY PEOPLE IN THE US, INCLUDING THOSE WHO WANT TO LIMIT ARMS AS WELL AS THOSE WHO ARE LESS INCLINED TO DO SO. THE US COULD, OF COURSE HAVE RESPONDED, AND STILL COULD RESPOND, ALONG THE SAME LINES BY GREATLY INCREASING ITS ICBM THROW-WEIGHT WITHIN THE LIMITATIONS OF THE AGREEMENT. THIS WAS LESS LIKELY BECAUSE IT SEEMED TO MOST OF THE US SIDE NOT TO BE THE MOST EFFECTIVE WAY TO GO. SOME US WEAPONS PLANNERS BELIEVE IT MORE SENSIBLE TO USE POSSIBLE CURRENT ADVANTAGES IN US TECHNOLOGY TO DEVELOP OTHER WEAPON SYSTEMS. THIS IS ONE
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RATIONALE FOR CRUISE MISSILES. IN ANY EVENT, AS BROWN HAD TOLD ARBATOV AND OTHERS IN MOSCOW THIS SPRING, THE INCREASE IN SOVIET MISSILE SIZE AND TOTAL THROW-WEIGHT IS VERY LIKELY TO LEAD TO US RESPONSE, NOT NECESSARILY RIGHT AWAY, AND NOT NECESSARILY OF THE SAME KIND. THE SOVIETS SIDE SHOULD THINK ABOUT THIS AS IT CONSIDERS CRUISE MISSILES AND SIZE LIMITATIONS ON ICBMS.

6. BACKFIRE ROWNY (TO TRUSOV AND BELETSKY, A-891) CHALLENGED

SEMENOV'S STATEMENT THAT THE US BASES ITS CASE FOR THE BACKFIRE ON SOVIET AIR REFUELING CAPABILITIES. ROWNY SAID THE US BASES ITS POSITION ON THE INHERENT CAPABILITIES OF THE BACKFIRE WHICH DO NOT MAKE IT DEPENDENT UPON AIR REFUELING.

7. TRUSOV REPLIED THAT THE SECDEF AND JCS CHAIRMAN HAD FREQUENTLY ALLUDED TO THE REQUIREMENT OF AIR REFUELING FOR THE BACKFIRE TO FLY MISSIONS WHICH WOULD TAKE OFF AND RECOVER IN THE SOVIET UNION. BELETSKY ADDED IT IS UNREALISTIC TO ASSES CAPABILITIES OF AN AIRCRAFT STRICTLY ON ONE-WAY MISSIONS, ESPECIALLY SINCE THE SOVIETS HAVE NO INTENTION OF USING NEUTRAL OR FRIENDLY COUNTRIES TO RECOVER THEIR BOMBERS. JOHNSON

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